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Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education: Setting a Stringent Standard
of Fault for School Liability in Peer
Sexual Harassment Under Title
IX-Demanding Responsible Proactive
Protection
I. INTRODUCTION
"Mommy I don't want to go to school today." "Young lady, education is
important and you do not have a choice, you are going." It is a struggle for many
parents each morning to motivate their children to attend school.' There are
numerous reasons lurking behind a child's resistance, one of which should not be
that the child is repeatedly being harassed by a peer while school officials
knowingly disregard the victim's complaints.2 The law requires that children
attend school; however, this does not entail that a student forfeit individual
protections merely upon entering a public school.' Moreover, it has long been
recognized that proper education incorporates instructing children on the basic
I. See Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women Found., Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual
Harassment in America's Schools, June 1999. The AAUW commissioned Louis Harris and Associates
who conducted a total of 1,632 surveys completed by seventy-nine schools across the Nation, in grades eight
through eleven. Id. at 5. Researchers found an alarming 81% of students reported some experience of
sexual harassment, of which four out of five had been the target of peer sexual harassment. Id. at 7. In
comparing sexual harassment of girls and boys: "among the 81% who report being harassed, the gender gap
is surprisingly narrow: 85% of girls and 76% of boys" participating in the surveys say they have been
victims of both physical and non-physical sexual harassment. Id. at 11.
2. See Marcia Coyle, Schools Liable When Students Sexually Harass Students, TEx. LAW., May
31, 1999, at2 (quoting Jim Harrington, director of the Texas Civil Rights Project, after the Court's decision
in Davis, "school districts will have to stop burying their head[s] in the sand and take steps to make sure
that young women are treated properly, with respect, and not abused"). See also Lauri Murphy, Editorial,
Letters Page, ROCKY MiN NEWS, Apr. 25, 1999, at 8B. The author points out that the sad reality of the
Massacre at Columbine High School is that it resulted from a situation that had been escalating for some
time, and administrators and parents that were aware of it dismissed the conflict as "harmless" teasing. Id.
3. See Doe v. Renfrow, 451 U.S. 1022, 1027-28 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that
although there is a compelling state interest in assuring that school officials are not overburdened in
attempting to fulfill their duty as educators to maintain a learning environment, students are still afforded
the protection of the Fourth Amendment).
technical and behavioral skills necessary to function as productive citizens.4
School officials have a duty to strive to create a positive environment that is
conducive to learning.5 The Court has recognized that fulfilling this duty requires
that school officials be given greater leniency when proactively intervening and
enforcing policies in order to heighten awareness and cease behaviors that threaten
one's right to an education.6 Despite the Court's general recognition of a duty and
the authoritative right of school officials to fulfill this duty,7 the courts and
Congress have been reluctant to translate this supervisory duty into an identifiable
and enforceable standard, resulting in uncertainty as to the scope of an educator's
duty.'
School officials lacking a clear understanding of their duty causes confusion,
which effectively exacerbates the problems of violence, harassment, and drugs that
critically threaten the American educational system.9 The Court's failure to
address the scope of this duty should not permit school officials to ignore the
existence of these problems, nor will it cause them to disappear. Millions of
Americans were horribly reminded that the problems still exist on April 20, 1999,
as the Nation watched the murderous rampage of two students at Columbine High
School in Littleton, Colorado.° Following this tragedy, its horrors became even
more shocking as investigations revealed that these students methodically planned
their attack, targeting athletes whom they believed instigated abuse and
4. See Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala.
1968) (noting that school officials have a duty and responsibility to maintain an educational atmosphere).
5. Id.
6. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (allowing school officials more leniency in
searching students than indicated in the Bill of Rights because of the unique characteristics of the public
school). See also Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,653 (1995) (granting schools a certain
degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures because a determination of reasonableness cannot
disregard the custodial duties of school officials and their primary responsibility to educate and train young
people).
7. See generally Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (examining the scope of
a school's permissible authority to enforce disciplinary policies, and finding that a school's interest in
carrying out the educational process outweighs a student's right to partake in conduct that is disruptive to
this process, even when such conduct falls within the scope of one's First Amendment rights).
8. See Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 366 (M.D. Ga. 1994), affd,
120 F.3d 1390 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
(addressing the scope of school official's supervisory duty and determining that the standard for evaluating
whether the duty has been fulfilled shall be deliberate indifference). See also 57 AM. JUR. 2D Municipal,
County, School and State Tort Liability § 540 (1988) (discussing duties and general standards of tort
liability for public educational agencies in cases where the lack of supervisory conduct is at issue).
9. See Moore, 284 F. Supp. at 731 (addressing illegal drug activity in a school dormitory, the court
found, pursuant to a balancing test, that a student's right to privacy is outweighed by the school's special
need to discourage illegal activity and enforce discipline in furtherance of its duty to operate an educational
institution).
10. See Editorial, Investigating Columbine The Issue: FBI's Lead Investigator Has Close Ties To
The School; Our View: The Bureau Has to be Prepared for Criticism, ROCKYMTN. NEWS, May 11, 1999,
at 34A.
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harassment toward the group of students the Columbine Killers associated. " The
Columbine Massacre may represent the most egregious outcome possible when
school officials act indifferently and fail to take disciplinary action towards on-
going disruptive behavior in schools. 2 Yet, Columbine clearly illustrates that the
school environment provides a breeding ground for hate, sexism, racism, and
violence, and in its aftermath it is imperative that school officials and parents join
forces to combat these social evils. 3
In the wake of the Columbine tragedy, there are many lessons to be learned,
and one that must not be ignored is the impact that bullying, teasing, and ridicule
have upon the most vulnerable of our citizens-children in schools. 4 Despite the
presence of these problems, society is advancing in its attempts to eliminate
discrimination and harassment by responsibly promoting awareness in order to
further prevention.' 5 Although the Government cannot erase stereotypical beliefs
that lead to discrimination and harassment, positive changes occurring in society
are allowing sexism to emerge from its dark closet.'6 Advancement is inevitable
because of the recognition of sexism as a form of discrimination that is pervasive
in society.' 7 Nevertheless, it is important that the Federal Government's efforts to
rid society of sexism not be limited to enforcement in the employment arena under
Title VII.'5
Under Title IX, Congress provides federal funding to educational institutions
11. See Brian Weber, District Was Warned of Increased Violence Sheriffs Conclusions About
Situation Are Still Exaggerations, School Officials Say, ROCKYMTN. NEWS, Apr. 22, 1999, at 13A (noting
that following the attack other students came forward, claiming that athletes continually harassed and
intimidated students who were outsiders, and school administrators continually ignored complaints even
after two of the athletes were arrested for assaulting a student, allegedly because he was Jewish).
12. See E.R. Shipp, Letters to the Editor, The 'Why' of Littleton, WASH. POST, May 9, 1999, at B8.
13. See State v. Drake, 662 A.2d 265,267 (N.H. 1995) (commenting that school officials are charged
with the paramount duty of fostering a learning environment "that facilitates learning and promotes
responsible citizenship").
14. See Lauri Murphy, Editorial, Letters Page, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, April 25, 1999 at 8B.
15. See Matthew Bowers & Alice Warchol, Zero Tolerance is Unavoidable, Educators Insist but
Critics Say Schools are Crossing Line Between Student Protection, Harassment, VIRGINIAN-PILOr &
LEDGER STAR, May 30, 1999, at Al (citing June L. Arnette, Associate Director National School Safety
Center (encouraging worried principals to err on the side of caution and develop good policy because it is
better to be safe than sorry)).
16. See id. (advocating a philosophy of "zero tolerance" in schools ("no weapons, no threats, no
excuses") because "what ifs" have grown scarily more plausible and it is too risky to take the chances that
come with loosening rules).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1999) (explicitly providing relief for harassment in employment
discrimination, and specifically in the form of monetary damages). See also Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep.
Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 282 (1998) (extending a private right of action to a student sexually harassed by
a school official after recognizing that when necessary, courts shall yield when permitting monetary
vindication of a right frustrates the purpose of the statute involved).
18. See generally Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
conditioned on the mandate that the institutions enforce policies furthering non-
discrimination on the basis of gender.19 In exercising this spending power,
Congress' authority to enforce the prohibitions of the Statute provide it with the
power to ultimately terminate funding if recipients fail to adequately uphold their
duties.2' At a minimum, this framework should demand responsible proactive
attempts by school officials to cease peer harassment of which they are aware and
that rises to a level of harmful intimidation, the nature of which threatens an
individual's right to an education.2'
In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Supreme Court reversed
the decisions of the lower courts, opting instead to add meaning to the
indeterminable scope of liability for educators in regards to their duty to prevent
peer sexual harassment. 22 The Court's decision effectively supports the policy
making efforts of Congress to actively combat sexual harassment by providing a
cognizable standard for when a school may be found liable. 23 The Court's holding
allows schools to be liable to individual victims of peer sexual harassment if they
are found to be "deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they have
actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can
be said to deprive the victim of access to the educational opportunities and benefits
provided by the school."'24
In attempting to protect victims of peer sexual harassment, Davis sets a very
high standard, but when achieved, it permits an individual to bring a cause of
action under Title IX.25 This decision demonstrates that the Court and Congress
are making a concerted effort to require schools to not only promote fairness and
equality, but to take disciplinary action when a student refuses to respect these
values.26 School administrators have the awesome potential to dramatically
influence the future of our Nation by molding citizens in an environment that
19. Education Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C. § 901 etseq. (1972), as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1681
et seq. (1994) (Title IX operates by conditioning offer of federal funding on promise by recipient not to
discriminate, in what amounts to essentially a contract between recipient and government controlling
dispersion of funds). Title IX was modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
race discrimination in programs receiving federal funding and in its amended form allows an express right
of action for monetary damages. § 1681 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (1999). Title VII is framed as
an outright prohibition, while private causes of action under Title IX require a recipient's liability in
damages be conditioned on actual notice and an opportunity for voluntary compliance before enforcement
proceedings commence. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 279-80.
20. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
21. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.8(b), 106.9(a) (1999) (requiring recipients of federal funds, in order to
comply with the Department of Education's regulations, adopt and publish grievance procedures for
resolution of discrimination complaints, and to notify students and others of the school's refusal to
discriminate on the basis of sex in education programs or activities operated by those programs).
22. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
23. See id. at 629-30.
24. Id. at 650.
25. Id. at 641-50.
26. See id.
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explicitly rejects discriminatory behavior.27 After Davis, schools will have to pay
for the harm they are causing the individual victim and the disservice they are
doing to society by not responding to offensive conduct in a reasonable manner
given the circumstances.28
This Note will examine the Court's decision in Davis and explore the
practical effects application of this new standard will have on advancing society's
fight against harassment by providing an avenue of relief for individual victims
of peer harassment. Part II-A will provide background information on Title IX 29
and will delve into the language of the statutory requirements Congress established
for educational institutions receiving federal funding. Part I1-B will illustrate the
expansive reach of Congress' spending power through which it has the ability to
control discrimination in schools, an area traditionally regulated by individual
states.3" Additionally, Part II-C will examine whether the language of the Statute
places schools on proper notice of their duty to individuals, thus creating a
justification for a private cause of action.3' Part III presents the facts and
procedural history of Davis,32 followed by an analysis of the arguments and basis
of support for the majority33 and dissenting opinions" in Part IV. Part V discusses
Davis' potential future judicial, legislative, and social implications.35 Part VI
concludes by applying common sense analysis to bolster positive support for the
likely ramifications of the Court's decision.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TITLE IX
A. The Development Of A Cause Of Action For Student-on- Student Sexual
Harassment Under Title IX
No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
27. See Julie Cart, Slain Student's Family Sues Parents of Colorado Killers, L.A. TIMES, May 28,
1999, at Ai I (quoting attorney Geoffrey Fieger "[tihis lawsuit is about duty, this lawsuit is about
accountability and this lawsuit is about responsibility").
28. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 636-38.
29. See infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 71-96 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 97-128 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 129-147 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 148-174 and accompanying text.
under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance .... "
Congress passed Title IX in 1972 to abolish sexual discrimination in federally
funded educational programs and activities.17 This Statute attempted to close the
loophole existing in anti-discrimination legislation, which provides no remedy for
sexual discrimination in public educational institutions: Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination based on race or national origin,38
while Title VII provisions eradicated discrimination based on sex, but only in the
context of employment. 9 Recently, suits for peer sexual harassment under Title
IX have emerged as the primary avenue for victims attempting to obtain monetary
relief from public schools." Although the language of Title IX, on its face, does
not provide a statutory remedy for an individual sexually harassed, claimants in
this area have successfully borrowed the theory of hostile environment harassment
defined and prohibited under Title VII. 4 1  Using this theory, peer sexual
harassment can be categorized as a violation of Title IX because the nature of the
offensive conduct creates a hostile environment in which the school setting
becomes one filled with sexually discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,
thus denying the individual an equal right to federally funded education. 2
Unlike employees, students are not agents of the schools. 43 A school's failure
to remedy known private discrimination, such as harassment by students, does not
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
37. Pub. L. No. 92-318; Title IX § 901,86 Stat. 373 (June 23, 1972). According to the bill sponsor,
Senator Bayh, its purpose is to provide women of America something that is rightfully theirs-an equal
chance to attain education. See S. Rep. 874, 92d Cong., 118 Cong. Rec. 5803 (1972) (enacted).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-4 (1994). Title VI provides: "No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42
U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-1 7 (1998). Title VII reads, in relevant part: "It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual ... because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
40. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (establishing the high standard
of "deliberate indifference" that must be met to successfully obtain relief under Title IX in cases where the
student is subjected to sexual harassment by a teacher); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560
(N.D. Cal. 1993), reconsidered, 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding for the first time that a cause
of action exists for peer sexual harassment); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)
(holding, unanimously, that a student is entitled to monetary damages under Title IX and not just equitable
relief for sexual harassment by a teacher).
41. By definition Title VII defines two types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
42. See Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 800 F.2d
1136 (3d Cir. 1986) (showing that Title VII standards, as set forth by the EEOC, are also appropriate for
Title IX).
43. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1399-400 and n.13 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629
(1999) (arguing that because students are not agents of a school board, agency principles are inapposite to
peer harassment under Title IX).
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make the state actor itself guilty of the discrimination Title IX prohibits.'
Possibly because of this apparent lack of incentive to combat sexual harassment,
schools in the past have been reluctant to take action, often looking the other way
when complaints arise."
B. A Split In Lower Court Decisions In Determining The Rights For
Victims Of Sexual Harassment In Schools
In developing Title IX case law to extend to a victim the right to bring a cause
of action against a school when the actor is a student, courts have sought guidance
in teacher-on-student harassment cases.' Furthermore, courts give some
deference to the Letter Findings expressed by the Office of Civil Rights ("OCR"),
the agency responsible for implementing Title IX.47 The OCR has indicated that
a school's failure to take action and attempt to remedy a situation effectively
permits the harassment." The Supreme Court first acknowledged that a student
should be afforded the same statutory protection from sexual harassment in
schools as in the workplace in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools.49 The
Court relied on the framework of Title VII jurisprudence to allow victims of sexual
harassment in educational contexts monetary damages; however, the decision only
addresses situations involving a teacher sexually harassing a student.5 ° By
interpreting the reasoning of Franklin narrowly, some courts have limited the
extension of monetary relief under Title IX in the context of peer sexual
harassment." Furthermore, in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District,52 the Supreme Court set a high standard for liability in sexual harassment
44. See N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (stating that the courts should
accord liability under Title IX that sweeps as broad as the language in the Provision). But see Rowinsky
v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title IX should be narrowly
interpreted, only holding a school district liable for sexual harassment if school officials themselves
participated in the discrimination).
45. See Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1565 (noting that most often, schools respond to a victim's
complaints with the view that the harasser must have been provoked or by characterizing the behavior at
issue as unavoidable adolescent teasing).
46. See id. at 1572.
47. See id. at 1573.
48. Id.
49. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
50. See id. at 76.
51. See Garza v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (deciding that
a student's peer sexual harassment claim was not supported by the decision in Franklin). See also
Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that individual monetary
claims for relief are limited to situations in which the harassment at issue is attributed to the conduct of the
grant recipients).
52. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
involving teacher-on-student claims, requiring that the school officials be on
notice of the harassment and exhibit "deliberate indifference" to the conduct. 3
C. Justification For A Private Cause Of Action In The School
Environment Under Title IX
The majority of lower courts have found that Title VI and Title VII are the
appropriate statutes for which to interpret and analogize extensions of liability
under Title IX.' The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Davis argued that the
Title VII standards provide minimum protection, while damage caused by sexual
harassment is arguably greater in the classroom than in the workplace.5
Harassment in the classroom is more severe because it generally has a greater and
longer lasting impact, and occurs at a crucial point in the intellectual development
where one should not be burdened by inhibitions that limit potential. 6 Moreover,
while a decision to leave work to avoid harassment may not be in one's best
interest for career purposes, an adult victim has the authority to make this choice,
whereas it is virtually impossible for a child to escape harassment in a school
where one's parents and the law require daily attendance. 7
Although the language of Title IX does not mandate that schools take action
against sexual harassment, undeniably, it must be recognized as a duty under Title
IX, for when children are subjected to ridicule and conduct damaging to self-
esteem, development is hindered and the repercussions ripple through society."
The law cannot expect children to endure sexually abusive conduct while growing
up when the law does not tolerate such conduct at the adult level in the
53. Id. at 277. The Court reasoned that Title IX is in effect a contract, thus, actual notice and
opportunity to come into compliance are prerequisites to liability in private enforcement actions. See id.
at 284-86. See also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (noting the Court's
agreement with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission that "Congress wanted courts to look to
agency principles for guidance in this area"); Murray v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249
(2d Cir. 1995) (establishing a basis of liability for the sexually harassing conduct of an employee being
imputed to an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior, when the plaintiff can show that the
employer "knew or should have known" of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial
action).
54. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560,1571 (N.D. Cal. 1993), reconsidered, 949
F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding Title IX similar to Title VII); Bosley v. Kearney R-I Sch.
Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (concluding that the anti-discrimination provision in Title
IX should be enforced under Title VII standards); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1231 n.5, 1233 (10th
Cir. 1996) (expressing no opinion as to the district courts refusal to apply Title VII to Title IX, but
considering the elements for a hostile environment claim); Burrow v. Postville Cmty. Sch. Dist., 929 F.
Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding the "the standards developed under Title VII for hostile
employment environment sexual harassment are appropriate").
55. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 120 F.3d
1390 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women Found., supra note 1, at 21.
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workplace.59 Yet, in holding schools liable under the hostile environment theory
it must be determined how severe the peer sexual harassment must be before
necessitating actions.'e Additionally, considerations must be taken into account
regarding the extent of control a school has over childish behavior that
incorporates offensive utterances, comments, and vulgarities that are not persistent
or go unreported until the victim leaves school.6' The necessary level of severity
is not one in which the child must be compelled to leave school before action is
appropriate.62 On the other end of the spectrum, absurd interpretations of one-time
adolescent misbehavior should not be considered to impair the child's learning.63
The Court has conceded that whether alleged harassment rises to an actionable
level "depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations and
relationships"' and that recognition must be given to the wide range of immature
behaviors typically displayed by children.65
After determining that student-on-student sexual harassment was actionable,
59. See Morse v. Regents ofthe Univ. Colo., 154 F.3d 1124,1129(10th Cir. 1998) (finding that the
allegation that the educational institution "knew of harassment... and did not respond adequately" was
sufficient to state a claim under Title IX).
60. See Jennifer C. Braceras, New Menace in the Schools: Hand Holding, WALL ST. J., May 25,
1999, at A26 (bashing the decision in Davis for making a federal case out of a teachers failure to prevent
student comments, and examining how extreme policies against sexual harassment will become-suggesting
that telling a classmate "you look nice" may constitute punishable behavior depending on the tone and
expressive manner of the perpetrator).
61. See Christina Hoff Sommers, The Preteen Sexual Harasser, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1999, at AI 5
(noting that in examining the issue in Davis, common sense suggests that fifth-grade misbehavior is best
handled outside of the federal courts by teachers, principals, and parents or when necessary by local and
state laws, but argues that common sense often loses in battles over gender politics).
62. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (requiring a plaintiff in a sexual
harassment suit against a co-worker to demonstrate that the harassment is so severe and objectively offensive
that it detracts from the victim's right to be free from sexual harassment and denies access to resources of
the institution).
63. See David G. Savage, Schools Ruled Liable for Sex Bias by Pupils, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1999,
at Al (quoting Julie Underwood, general counsel for the school board group "[w]e can live with this
standard, lilt will be rare if a school is held liable"). The author notes that the National School Boards
Group is pleased with the threshold for liability set in Davis because it protects children while not putting
schools at a huge financial risk (noting Executive Director, Anne Bryant's comment that six years ago, the
group warned school officials they could be held liable for repeatedly ignoring complaints about severe peer
harassment and that two years ago, the Education Department's Office for Civil Rights sent a similar
warning). See id.
64. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
65. See Dep't of Educ., Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"), Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment
of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 49, 12040 (Mar. 13,
1997) (including, but not limited to, the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number of individuals
involved). See also Dep't of Educ., Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational
Institutions; Investigative Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 47, 11448, 11448-50 (Mar. 10, 1994) (outlining
guidelines for investigative measures under Title IV).
a panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Davis set forth a cohesive
balancing test for determining whether the harassment is severe enough to require
a remedy.66 The court held that Title IX is violated when the harassment
permeates the educational setting with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult that is so severe and pervasive that it sufficiently alters the conditions of a
student's environment and creates an abusive setting.67 In determining when
conduct crosses the line between child's play and the types of vulgar harassment
that would necessitate attention, the court focused on the following factors: "(1)
the frequency of the abusive conduct; (2) the conduct's severity; (3) whether [the
conduct] is physically threatening or humiliating rather than merely offensive; and
(4) whether [the conduct] unreasonably interferes with the plaintiff's
performance."68
Lastly, before concluding that the behavior in question constitutes a violation
under Title IX, the conduct must be found to be both objectively abusive from the
viewpoint of a reasonable person and subjectively the victim must perceive the
environment to be abusive.69 This takes into account that a teacher may adjudge
conduct in a different way than a student and helps to avoid categorizing simple
childish play and flirting as behavior rising to the level of vulgar harassment that
must be effectively controlled by school officials witnessing the conduct.7'
Il1. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
Between December 1992 and May 1993, G.F.,7" a male fifth-grade student at
Monroe County, a Georgia elementary school, sexually harassed a fellow peer,
LaShonda.72 The offenses included repeated attempts by G.F. to fondle her and the
use of vulgar language directed toward LaShonda.7" The acts alleged in the
complaint go far beyond school yard teasing. For example, in December, G.F. told
LaShonda, "I want to get in bed with you," and "I want to feel your boobs," and
66. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. Of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1194 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 120 F.3d
(11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17,23 (1993)).
69. Id.
70. See Alexandra A. Bodnar, Comment, Arming Studentsfor Battle: Amending Title IX to Combat
the Sexual Harassment of Students by Students in Primary and Secondary School, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WoMEN'S SwUD. 549, 583 (1996) (commenting that the severity of harassment accordingly, is judged by
both the fact finder and the student-victim, and demonstrates varying reactions to conduct by illustrating a
situation involving a first-grader being kissed on the cheek).
71. The harasser is given anonymity, but the victim is identified. See Katie Wood, Comment, Holding
School Systems Liable for Peer Sexual Harassment, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 695,698 (1998) (discussing
the difficulties litigants experience in establishing a viable cause of action for sexual harassment and noting
that because of the possible apprehension and embarrassment of being identified as a victim of sexual
harassment, victims are often reluctant to file such claims).
72. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1188-89 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev 'd, 120 F.3d 1390 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev 'd and
remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
73. Id. at 1189.
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he attempted to grab her breasts and vaginal area.74 Again in February, during
gym class, G.F. put a doorstop down the front of his pants and acted in a sexually
offensive manner towards LaShonda." In April, again, G.F. confronted LaShonda
in the school hallway and intentionally rubbed his body against her in a sexually
explicit manner." Furthermore, LaShonda was not the only victim of the repeated
offenses; however, school officials who knew of the reported incidents failed to
take disciplinary action against G.F.77 Despite LaShonda reporting each incident
to her teachers, and her mother contacting the principal and teachers after every
incident but one to request protection for her daughter,78 the school officials did
nothing beyond making mere threats of punishment to G.F.'
G.F.'s sexual harassment continued to grow increasingly severe until May,
when he pled guilty to a criminal charge of sexual battery concerning the school
incidents.' During the three months of the alleged harassment, the only action
taken by school officials was merely permitting LaShonda to move her seat away
from G.F.8 Moreover, throughout the duration of the events in question, school
officials never provided personnel information in order to heighten awareness of
peer-sexual harassment, never instructed personnel on how to respond effectively
if they witnessed harassing conduct, nor developed a policy to deal with such
issues.82
Consequently, Petitioner, Aurelia Davis, brought suit on behalf of her minor
daughter against the Monroe County School Board, superintendent, and principal
.of the elementary school concerning the harassment by G.F., seeking injunctive
74. Id. (citing Complaint of Petitioner 17).
75. See Aurelia D. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 364 (M.D. Ga. 1994), rev'd in
part affd in part, 74 F.3d 1186 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 120 F.3d 1390 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd and
remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
76. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1189 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 120 F.3d 1390 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd and
remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
77. Davis, 526 U.S. 629, 634 (1999) (citing Complaint of Petitioner 16 (alleging that the school
denied access to other girls who fell victim to the conduct of G.F. by denying their requests to speak to the
principal).
78. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1189 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 120 F.3d 1390 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd and
remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). LaShonda told her mother that she "didn't know how much longer she
could keep him off her." Id.
79. Davis, 526 U.S. at 635 (citing Complaint of Petitioner 19 (noting that several of the incidents of
harassment were witnessed by students and occurred while the children were under the supervision of a
classroom teacher)).
80. Id. (citing Complaint of Petitioner at 14).
81. Id. (citing Complaint of Petitioner at 13).
82. Id.
relief and compensatory damages.83 The suit was brought on the basis of section
1681 (a) of Title IX,84 which prohibits discrimination in educational institutions
that receive federal funding.85 LaShonda's mother alleged that the persistent
sexual advances created an intimidating, hostile, offensive, and abusive
environment that effectively denied LaShonda her right to an education free of
discrimination.86 Thus, because the school knew of the harassment and failed to
intervene in the situation, the school effectively permitted the harassment and
should be held liable to the individual victim.87
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed
the Title IX claim holding that because a student's sexually harassing behavior is
not part of a school program or activity, and because neither the defendant nor any
school official took part in the harassment, LaShonda's harm was not
"proximately caused by a federally-funded educational provider."88 Petitioner
appealed the District Court's decision and a Court of Appeals panel reversed,
recognizing Title IX as a vehicle for relief when a school official's failure to take
action against reported peer sexual harassment creates a hostile environment.
89
Following a motion for rehearing, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the District Court's dismissal.' ° The
court determined that Title IX does not provide adequate grounds for damages in
a private cause of action, even in situations where the peer harassment creates a
hostile learning environment and school officials knowingly fail to act to prevent
the harassment.9' The primary basis for this decision was that Title IX was passed
pursuant to Congress' legislative authority under the Spending Clause,92 thus,
83. See Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 636, 364 (M.D. Ga. 1994), rev'd
in part aff'd in part, 74 F.3d 1186 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev 'd, 120 F.3d 1390 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd and
remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
84. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994). See supra part 1l-A (discussing the protections Title IX affords
students under 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994). A "program or activity" includes "all of the operations of..
a local educational agency.., or other school system." 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994).
85. Davis, 526 U.S. at 632-33.
86. See id. at 636.
87. Id.
88. See Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 367 (M.D. Ga. 1994), rev'd
in part affd in part, 74 F.3d 1186 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 120 F.3d 1390 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd and
remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999). The trial court dismissed the Title IX claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a claim may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted." Id. at 366. In review of the motion to dismiss, the district court viewed
the factual allegations as true and made all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Id. at 365. See
also Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25,27 n.2 (1977); Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11 th Cir.
1993); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332, 334 (11 th Cir. 1992).
89. Davis, 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 120 F.3d 1390(11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd and
remanded, 526 U.S. 629, 636 (1999).
90, See id. at 1188. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her § 1983 due process claims against all
defendants. Id.
91. See id. at 1186.
92. U.S. CONST., art. I § 8, cl. I (providing that: "The Congress shall have [the] power to... provide
for the... general welfare of the United states").
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recipients must be provided adequate notice of the conditions they are assuming
upon acceptance." The court reasoned that the language of Title IX adequately
notifies recipients that they must stop employees from engaging in discriminatory
conduct, but does not give sufficient notice of a duty to prevent peer sexual
harassment.' The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
conflict in the circuits95 over whether Title IX subjects recipients of funding to
liability in a private cause of action for failure to respond to a victim's complaints
of student-on-student sexual harassment.96
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. The Majority Ruling
Justice O'Connor's opinion97 focused on the Court's prior decisions regarding
claims based on anti-discrimination statutes,98 the purpose of Title IX, and
implications the language of the Statute places on recipients' in concluding that
93. Davis, 120 F.3d 1390, 1399 (1997), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
94. ld. at 1401.
95. Compare Davis, 120 F.3d 1390 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629 (1999),
and Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 861
(1996) (holding that private damages action for student-on-student harassment are available under Title IX
only where funding recipient responds to these claims indifferently based on the victim's gender), with Doe
v. Univ. of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 668 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, vacated and remanded sub nom., Bd.
of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., 526 U.S. 1142 (1992) (upholding private damages action under Title IX for
funding recipient's inadequate response to known student-on-student harassment); Brzonkala v. Va.
Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 960-61 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding a valid claim under Title
IX where University's inadequate response to rape created a hostile environment), vacated and affd en
banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), affd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 120 S.
Ct. 1740 (2000), and Oona R.S. v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting qualified
immunity claim and concluding that failure to prevent student-on-student harassment during the 1992-93
year violated clearly established Title IX rights), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999).
96. Davis, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
97. Justice Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice O'Connor in the majority opinion.
Id. at 632.
98. See id. at 639 (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283,284-90 (1998)
(establishing that teacher-on-student sexual harassment constitutes a violation of Title IX and that damages
may be an appropriate remedy)). See also Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)
(permitting money damages under Title IX); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n. of N.Y. City, 463
U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) (permitting Title VI, private damages only when recipients had adequate notice
that they could be liable for discrimination).
99. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633 (discussing Petitioner's argument, that as a member of the class the Statute
is designed to protect, the Court should conclude that the language of Title IX has an "unmistakable focus"
on the victim, (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 691 (1979), rather than the perpetrator, thus
compelling the conclusion that the Statute should function to protect students from discrimination.). See
a recipient of federal education funding may be liable for damages for
discrimination resulting from a school's unreasonable response to student-on-
student sexual harassment.7°° After establishing the basis of her analysis for
liability for peer harassment under Title IX, Justice O'Connor identified the two
issues the Court's decision resolved.' 0 1
First, Justice O'Connor defined the scope of a recipient's behavior under Title
IX, requiring that schools proactively attempt to cease sexual harassment against
members of a protected class by a peer. " In adopting the deliberately indifferent
standard the Court previously applied in Gebser, "3 Justice O'Connor asserted that
imposition of liability does not stem from misconduct of the third party inflicting
the harassment.""° Rather, the recipient's own decision to remain idle and not
remedy student-on-student sexual harassment, of which it had actual knowledge,
amounts to an intentional violation of Title IX. o
Additionally, Justice O'Connor reiterated that application of the deliberately
indifferent standard shall be applied narrowly to instances where the funding
recipient has substantial control over the harasser" and the authority 1 to take
remedial action.0" Justice O'Connor indicated that the custodial nature of the
school setting effectively demands school officials to proscribe acceptable norms
of conduct that must be adhered to by students, and that adequate disciplinary
measures must be taken in response to conduct that goes against these norms."
Second, the decision establishes a private cause of action against recipients
also supra Part 11-A (discussing the provisions of Title LX).
100. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 633, 639-40.
101. See id. at 638.
102. Id. at 641.
103. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998) (concluding that a recipient of
federal funding may be liable under Title IX where it is deliberately indifferent to known acts of sexual
harassment by a teacher).
104. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643.
105. Id. (pointing out that in the Title iX context the Court has rejected the use of agency principles
used in Title VII).
106. Id. at 644-45 (noting that the deliberate indifference of the recipient must cause or make the victim
vulnerable to harassment, and the harassment must occur in a context which the school controls).
107. See Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (noting that on many occasions
the Court has recognized that schools are afforded a level of comprehensive authority that permits a degree
of supervision and control that could not be exercised over adults). See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985). The
maintenance of discipline in the school setting requires students to be restrained from fighting and
committing crimes, and additionally requires conformity to standards of conduct prescribed by school
officials. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 646 (citing Davis, 74 F.3d 1186, 1193 (11 th Cir. 1996), rev 'd, 120 F.3d
1390 (11 th Cir. 1997), rev'd and remanded, 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999)). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 152 (1965) (supporting the common law recognition of the school's disciplinary
authority).
108. See Davis, 526 U.S. 629, 646 (1999) (noting that in the case at bar, the misconduct occurred on
school grounds and during hours of school supervision-specifically, most of the harassment took place in
the classroom).
109. See id. at 646.
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who fail to fulfill their duty under Title IX, indicating that the Statute provides
adequate notice of liability for the conduct at issue."' Justice O'Connor
recognized the Court's fundamental requirement in Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman,"' that recipients of federal funds have notice of their
potential liability for a monetary award."'
In her opinion, Justice O'Connor was adamant that the regulatory scheme
surrounding Title IX, 3 coupled with the Department of Education's requirement
that recipients monitor the conduct of third parties in order to prevent dis-
crimination, " 4 provides funding recipients adequate notice that they may be liable
for failing to respond to discriminatory acts of certain non-agents, "5 Furthermore,
she ascertained support for holding recipients liable by pointing out that in prior
decisions the Court has surpassed limitations created by notice when the conduct
at issue involved an intentional violation of Title IX by the recipient."'
In concluding that recipients may be liable for their deliberate indifference to
known acts of peer sexual harassment, Justice O'Connor stressed that the Court's
decision should not force administrators to adhere to rigid disciplinary procedures
and directed courts to "refrain from second guessing the disciplinary decisions
made by school administrators."" 7 She rejected the dissent's mischaracterization
of the standard as requiring a "remedy" to victims of peer harassment, and instead
clarified that a recipient's response shall only be deemed deliberately indifferent
110. See id. at 643-44.
111. 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (interpreting language in spending legislation, insisting that Congress speak
with a clear voice, and allowing suits for damages only when the recipient of funds is aware of the
conditions imposed by the legislation).
112. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 641-42.
113. See id. at 641-42 (noting that at the time of the event in question, school attorneys and
administrators were being warned by the National School Boards Association, that peer sexual harassment
could trigger liability under Title IX). The Court did not find that the warnings constituted actual
congressional notice, but found that they supported the Court's reading of Title IX. Id. (Citing NAnONAL
SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION COUNCIL OF SCHOOL ATTORNEYS, SExuAL HARASSMENT IN THE SCHOOLS:
PREVENTING AND DEFENDING AGAINSTCLAIMS 45 (rev. ed. 1993) (warning schools of liability for student-
on-student sexual harassment if they have actual knowledge or a district employee has been notified)).
114. See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.31(b)(6), 106.31(d), 106.37(a)(2), 106.38(a)(2) (1998).
115. Davis, 526 U.S. 629, 643-44 (1999) (noting, additionally, that common law places schools on
notice that they may be held responsible for failing to protect students from a third party's tortuous conduct
(citing RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 320, and cmt. a (1965))). See, e.g., Brahatcek v. Millard Sch.
Dist., 273 N.W.2d 680, 688 (Neb. 1979); McLeod v. Grant County Sch. Dist., 255 P.2d 360, 362-63
(Wash. Sup. Ct. 1953).
116. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 641-42 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74
(1992) (concluding that "Pennhurst does not bar a private damages action under Title IX where the funding
recipient engages in intentional conduct that violates the clear terms of the Statute")).
117. See id. at 648 (stressing that courts should continue to allow schools discretion in formulating
proper disciplinary measures (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342-43, n.9 (1985))).
if it is "clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.""' Furthermore,
Justice O'Connor criticized the dissent's assumption that by providing relief under
Title IX, situations will occur in which victims will demand specific actions at
remedial levels and threaten suits if they are not followed."9
Last, Justice O'Connor focused on the level of severity to which the conduct
in question must rise before a recipient will be held liable.2 In determining this,
she concentrated her analysis on the terms of Title IX in order to adhere to its
objectives. 2 ' Justice O'Connor contended that the Statute functions not only to
protect students from discrimination, but to ensure they are not excluded from
participating in, or denied the benefits of programs or activities offered by an
educational institution.'22 Thus, in order to trigger a claim for damages, the
behavior in question must be so overt and offensive that it physically deprives, or
"so undermines and detracts from the victims' educational experience" that it
effectively causes a denial of equal access to the recipient's resources.'23
Justice O'Connor did not provide a bright line demarcation of what
constitutes actionable peer harassment, because in each case the surrounding
circumstances must factor into determining if the acts are so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that they deny a victim equal access. 24 However, in drawing
her conclusion, Justice O'Connor admonished the dissent for failing to appreciate
the limits set by the majority, which should not be erroneously interpreted as
providing damages for simple name-calling and playground teasing.'-
After establishing the standard necessary to bring a claim for student-on-
student sexual harassment under Title IX, Justice O'Connor turned to the facts at
issue in Davis.'26 She determined that Petitioner sufficiently demonstrated a
causal link between the misconduct of G.F. and the severe decline in LaShonda's
grades to provide the requisite showing of a potential denial of equal access to
118. See id. at 648-49.
119. See id. at 648 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 650.
121. See supra Part II-A (noting the terms of 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) and discussing the legislative intent).
122. See Davis, 526 U.S. 629,650 (1999) (commenting that Title IX is not merely prohibitory towards
the actions of the recipient, rather it also demands a recipient shield a member of the protected class from
exclusion resulting from another's discriminatory conduct).
123. See id. at 649-51 (noting that in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,281 (1998)
and Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 50,74-75 (1992), the Court "previously determined
that 'sexual harassment' is 'discrimination' in the school context under Title IX," thus, the focus in
determining liability should be on the severity).
124. See id. at 650-51 (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998)
(determining that whether gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of actionable harassment depends on
the "constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships," including but not limited
to, the ages of the students, the egregiousness of the conduct, and whether recipients flagrantly ignored
notification)).
125. See id. at 652 (noting that instances rising to the level necessary to obtain relief will be rare and
advising courts not to be misled by the dissent's portrayal of the majority's standard as one that will lead
to the imposition of sweeping liability by the courts).
126. See id. at 653.
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survive dismissal.'27 In remanding Davis, Justice O'Connor directed the court to
be cautious in applying the standard set by the majority, recognizing its limits
when examining whether the pervasiveness, severity of the actions, and the
recipients' alleged knowledge and deliberate indifference entitled LaShonda to
relief. 2
B. The Dissent
In the Court's only dissent, Justice Kennedy faulted the majority's decision
for effectively permitting the federal government to intrude and set policy in an
area traditionally controlled by states.'29 He painted the ruling as a threat to the
safeguards erected in the federal system due to judicially imposed liability, rather
than a victory for a student in a situation where she is continuously subjected to
severe harassment while school officials turn a deaf ear to pleas for help. 3 °
Justice Kennedy grounded his justification against liability on the notice
requirement of Spending Clause legislation. 3' Unlike the majority who found
constructive notice from the surrounding regulations and warnings, Justice
Kennedy did not believe the recipients should have been liable because "Congress
has not specifically spoken" on the issue.'32 After reexamining the language of
Title IX, Justice Kennedy established that nowhere in the terms are recipients
given clear unambiguous notice of liability for discriminatory acts of their
127. See id. at 654 (examining the allegations in the complaint ,Justice O'Connor determined that the
Court could not say without a doubt the Petitioner was entitled to relief because the case at the lower levels
was dismissed before either side had a chance to present their case, thus, whether Petitioner is entitled to
relief under the alleged facts must be determined on remand).
128. See Davis, 526 U.S. 629, 654 (1999) (noting that the Court has decided the issue whether
claimant was permitted to offer evidence in support of her claim and, now that liability has been established
it is important that after further proceedings the decision be consistent with the criteria set by the majority).
129. See id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (predicting that the Nation's schools will be subjected to
ever-present federal regulators dictating discipline and standards of conduct in one of the most traditional
areas of state affairs).
130. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that, because the scope of potential liability would be one
of the most weighty considerations for a school in deciding whether to accept funding, liability must be
clearly stated not implied).
131. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that when the statute at issue is pursuant to the Spending
Clause there must be clear and unambiguous notice (quoting Pennhurst St. Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (holding "[tihere can, of course, be no knowing acceptance [of the terms of a putative
contract] if a State is unaware of the conditions [imposed by legislation] or is unable to ascertain what is
expected of it"))).
132. See id. at 656 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. 274, 284 (1998)). See also
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 217 (1987) (noting that a clearly established safeguard against
excessive federal intrusion into state affairs is that clear notice be given of conditions attached to contracts
for federal funds).
students. '33 He proposed that the primary intent of Title IX is to prevent the unfair
disbursement of federal funds, not to provide relief to victims of discrimination.134
Next, Justice Kennedy provided a strict translation of the language of section
1681(a) of Title IX, which states that a violation occurs if one is "subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity."'' 31 Justice Kennedy
relied upon numerous dictionaries to support his translation, that to constitute
"under," authorization of an action is required. 36  In rejecting liability, he
continued to focus on the actions of the third party, which the majority clearly
stated did not create the liability, rather it was the school's inaction in attempting
to prohibit discrimination."'
Justice Kennedy's main concern was that schools will be bombarded with
lawsuits, due to what he characterized as an open-ended standard set by the
majority. 38 He warned that although in the end a court may find for the school,
the cost of defending frivolous actions will threaten and detract from the already
scarce resources of school districts. 13 Justice Kennedy attacked the majority for
setting an arbitrary line to determine when a school has a sufficient degree of
control over the students in order to warrant liability."°
Justice Kennedy acknowledged that in 1972, when Title IX was enacted, the
concept of sexual-harassment as discrimination was not recognized."' Despite
133. See id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority also acknowledges that the
language of Title IX only prohibits misconduct by grant recipients, not third parties). See also supra Part
I-A (discussing the terms of Title IX).
134. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 292). See also
supra Part Il-A and B (discussing the developments of Title IX causes of action premised on liability
imposed by Title VI and VII).
135. Davis, 526 U.S. at 659 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2487
(1981) (defining "under" as "required by, in accordance with, bound by"); AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1395 (1981) (defining "under" as "[w]ith the authorization of,
attested by, by virtue of'); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2059 (2d ed. 1987)
(defining "under" as "authorized, warranted, or attested by" or "in accordance with"); 43 WORDS AND
PHRASES 149-52 (1969) (defining "under" as, "in accordance with" or "in conformity with")). See id. at
659-60 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469 (1991).
137. See id. at 658-59 (arguing that the school "subjects" its students to discrimination when the school
knows of harassment and fails to respond in a manner that is clearly inappropriate).
138. See id. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the standard set by the majority and
analogizing its actions to the building of a fence made of little sticks when one is aware of an impending
avalanche).
139. Id. at 657-58 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
140. See Davis, 526 U.S. 629, 657 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Jeff Millar, Sexual
Harassment Case Muddies Waters For School Boards, HOUSTON. CHRON., May 27, 1999, at 2 (criticizing
Justice O'Connor's criterion for actionable harassment for lacking a clear unit of measure, and
characterizing G.F.'s behavior as outright cruel and overt teasing that should have been stopped by a school
official, not transformed into a matter of sexual harassment).
141. See id. at 664 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that under Title IX sexual harassment had not been
considered by the courts, but argues that despite recognition, there is no basis in law or fact for holding a
school liable for student-on-student sexual harassment because the school lacks the necessary control over
students to justify liability). See generally C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENTOF WORKING WOMEN:
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this, he found no basis for extending Title IX coverage by recognizing a causal
link between a school's inaction in disciplinary measures and the misconduct of
a third-party that is so severe that it effectively denies one equal access to a
school's programs. 42 Justice Kennedy supported his position by determining that,
although schools are rife with inappropriate social behavior, they are not granted
the amount of control necessary to remedy a victim's complaints because their
disciplinary actions are too constrained by state and federal laws. 143 Additionally,
he found no justification in holding schools liable for behavior he contended
cannot be labeled as sexual harassment.'" Rather, Justice Kennedy believed the
conduct the majority referred to as actionable peer harassment should have been
seen for what he viewed it: a normal adolescent process where minors struggle to
express emerging sexual identities.'45
Justice Kennedy's dissent concluded by focusing on the impracticability of
forcing schools to control the acts of thousands of immature students,'" and he
stressed conservation because schools "lack the resources even to deal with serious
problems of violence and are already overwhelmed with disciplinary problems of
all kinds."' 47 From this statement and the dissent's overall tone, logically, one
may infer that Justice Kennedy does not believe sexual harassment is a serious
problem in society. The reason for this, possibly, may be that he has never been
placed in a situation in which he is the target of sexual harassment, thus making
it difficult for him to understand why a school's deliberate indifference constitutes
an egregious discriminatory act against a victim.
A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 59-72 (1979).
142. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 665 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
143. See id. at 664-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy claimed that schools are too limited
in their disciplinary actions to justify liability because, while attempting to remedy harassment, they also
have an obligation to fulfill the harasser's fundamental right to education by providing alternative programs
if suspension is necessary. d. at 664 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Phillip Leon M. v. Greenbrier County
Bd. Of Educ., 484 S.E.2d 909 (W. Va. 1996). Further, the dissent demands that the notice and hearing
requirements under the due process clause constrict the disciplinary actions. Id. at 665 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975)). Lastly, he asserts that the liability is
impractical because of the requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20
U.S.C. § 1400-91 (1994), which places strict limits on schools when disciplining a student with behavioral
disorders. Davis, 526 U.S. at 665 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
145. See id. at 675 (Kennedy, I., dissenting). For example, Justice Kennedy noted, "a teenager's
romantic overtures to a classmate (even when persistent and unwelcome) are an inescapable part of
adolescence." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 680-81 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the possibility of"limitless liability" facing
schools).
147. Id. at 666 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
A. Judicial Impact: Responsibly Maintaining The High Standard Set In
Davis
1. Applying the Standard to the Case at Bar
It is important to reiterate that the instances of peer harassment the Court
referenced from the Davis Complaint, as illustrations to assist in developing the
boundaries for the deliberately indifferent standard, remain as mere allegations.'
On remand, the merits of Davis' case will be examined for the first time. This will
require Davis to offer proof to substantiate her claims, and for the first time, the
school will have the opportunity to air its version of the events to a jury, 9
providing that the Monroe County School Board does not enter into a settlement
agreement following its loss in the battle over the claim's permissibility.
The allegations in the Complaint 15 ° are egregious and, if accurate, many
school administrators across the Nation hope the parties settle. A settlement will
prevent establishing a precedent for the new cause of action through a suit that
negatively implicates a school board.' 5 ' Ideally, administrators would favor the
precedent-setting case to be one in which a court has the opportunity, based on the
facts presented, to rule in favor of a school and find that the actions taken by the
administrators involved, however slight, adequately fulfill the deliberately
indifferent standard. 152
Assuming the parties will proceed, based on the fact that neither conceded to
148. See id. at 650-54 (remanding the case to the Eleventh Circuit after determining that Petitioner's
claim was actionable).
149. See Jonathan Ringel, Little Girl's Case Hits the Big Time, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, Jan.
11, 1999, at I (noting that few facts have been established in the case, due to its dismissal for failure to state
a claim before the school filed a response, and quoting Davis' lawyer's statement that schools "aren't
expected to be magicians" in ceasing sexual harassment).
150. See supra Part III (recounting the facts asserted in Davis' Complaint).
151. See Larry Copeland, Court Tackles Harassment in Schools, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 1999, at I A
(noting the Monroe County School Superintendent's comments disputing Davis' claim that she repeatedly
complained to the teacher, principal, and board, and his statement that the school has not had a chance to
tell its version of the events).
152. E.g., Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), affd, 1200
S. Ct. 1740 (2000). In this case, petitioner filed suit against the University based on a hostile environment
claim due to its handling of her sexual assault claim against two football players. Id. at 953. After
reviewing her claim, the University's judicial panel suspended one of the men for a summer for using
abusive language and never brought the second individual up on formal charges. Id. at 955. Following the
Court's ruling in Davis, an attorney for Brzonkala said she would file an amended complaint in district
court. Sara Hebel, Supreme Court Says Colleges May Be Liable for Student-on-Student Harassment,
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 4, 1999, at A40.
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a settlement while on the long road to the Supreme Court, the court must act
cautiously to ensure that "in the context of student-on-student harassment,
damages are available only where the behavior is so severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive that it denies its victim the equal access to education that
Title IX is designed to protect."'53
2. Cautious Development of Standards of School Liability for Peer
Sexual Harassment
Undoubtedly, the most immediate impact of Davis will be upon the efforts of
schools to prevent sexual harassment by adopting written policies.4 The daunting
challenge educators will face in creating policies will be developing a clear and
functional definition that determines, beyond the facts presented in Davis, what
constitutes peer sexual harassment. By doing so, educators will be able to provide
the courts with a reference point for determining liability, rather than the
definition being developed by juries on an ad hoc basis.
Despite school officials making concerted efforts to prevent peer sexual
harassment, it is inevitable in our litigious society that numerous instances will
arise in which a victim's parents will seek legal redress due to their disagreement
with the disciplinary actions of the school.'55 Thus, the dissent's concerns'56 are
legitimately worrisome. In setting the boundaries for violations under the new
Title IX cause of action, it is important for all courts to strongly convey that the
threshold for proving deliberate indifference is extremely high, and liability should
be limited to instances in which a school administrator wholly fails to address
repeated complaints of harassment, not when a targeted individual's parents are
unsatisfied with the administrator's disciplinary decision.' 57
153. Davis, 526 U.S. 629, 652 (1999) (noting that it is important that courts adhere to the majority's
instructions and dismiss all but the most egregious claims).
154. See Emmalena K. Quesada, Note, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer Sexual
Harassment and the Standard for School Liability Under Title IX, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1014, 1059-62
(1998) (noting that written policies are important in preventing liability because, in determining whether
a school's response is adequate, courts look for evidence of an effective, publicized policy and a complaint
procedure (quoting JOHN F. LEWIs & SusAN C. HAsnNGs, SEXuAL HARAssMENT IN EDUCATION 20 (2d ed.
1994))).
155. See Christopher T. Nixon, Note, Civil Rights Law-Title IX-School Liability for Student-to-
Student Sexual Harassment, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 74 F.3d 1186 (1lth Cir.
1996), 64 TENN. L. REV. 237, 257 (1996) (noting that although the holding significantly increases school
liability, it will also have positive effects by helping to reduce the occurrences of sexual harassment because
victims will more likely come forward and report unacceptable harassment to school officials).
156. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 654-86 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 650-52. See also supra, Part IV-A (discussing the majority's contemplations for the
applicability of liability under Title IX).
Courts face the difficult task of setting a meaningful framework that allows
for immediate dismissal, short of placing an unnecessary burden on a school, when
a claim fails to reach the requisite level of severity.158 The majority did not
mandate prevention; however, it emphasized merely that the school's response not
be deliberately indifferent. Thus, the requisite response is lesser than the common
legal standard of reasonableness. 59 This lower standard allows for flexibility.
Therefore, courts should strive to prohibit misapplication of the standard which
could lead to circumventing an administrator's sound professional judgment when
resolving disputes. t
Furthermore, the majority repeatedly referred to the conduct of
"administrators" and the "school board" as the source of potential liability.'6 '
Thus, in determining whether a school had the requisite "actual knowledge" of the
harassment, courts should place the burden on the proponent to prove a school
administrator had actual knowledge; not merely a teacher, bus driver, or
schoolyard supervisor.'62
B. The Immediate Impact Of Davis On Schools
In the past, many schools responded to complaints of harassment by
suggesting that the victim "did something" to provoke the unacceptable behavior,
or shrugged off the complaint as evidence that "boys will be boys."' 63 The decision
in Davis forces schools to proactively respond to the problem of peer sexual
harassment in American schools."6 Under the threat of monetary damages,
schools will expand their harassment-prevention policies to specifically include
training programs for teachers on how to recognize peer harassment, counsel
158. See Ringel, supra note 149, at I (noting criticisms of Phillip Hartley, whose law firm represents
about 100 school boards in Georgia, which state that "[i]f the school loses... '[i]t could have a profound
impact on school systems,' and on state budgets, since 'obviously we're talking about taxpayers being
liable."').
159. See Savage, supra note 63, at Al (noting comments by a California Department of Education
spokesman, conveying his view that California does not have to worry about the floodgates of litigation
opening because procedures are already in place in its schools; rather, the decision merely sends a message
to schools lacking policies, that no longer will they be permitted to ignore sexual harassment).
160. See Quesada, supra note 154, at 1060-62 (noting that appropriate policies are those that are clear
and understandable by students and school officials in explaining what constitutes sexual harassment,
dictating how the conduct should be addressed, and establishing an open forum for complaints).
161. Davis, 526 U.S. 629 passim (1999).
162. Lisa A. Brown, New Harassment Ruling Can Work, NAT'LL.J., June 14, 1999, at A23 (noting
that drawing the line and requiring actual knowledge by school administrators will minimize the liability
risks the dissent is concerned with, while furthering the majority's goal of protecting victims subjected to
severe harassment when a school fails to offer any solutions).
163. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1565 (N.D. Cal. 1993), reconsidered, 949
F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
164. See Lisa A. Brown, The School ofDeliberate Indifference a Look at Student-on-Student Sexual
Harassment, 15 TEX. LAW. 22, Aug. 9, 1999, at 30 (noting that the familiar strategies for preventing
disputes are educating and counseling students on proper behavior, involving parents, documenting
communications and discipline attempts, and consequentially increasing punishments for repeat offenders).
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victims, and develop grievance procedures that are sensitive to the situation. 165
The Court's express recognition that there is a need to combat peer
harassment because it is a serious problem will function to help eradicate the
perpetuation of harassment through education and by heightening awareness.16
At some period in a student's schooling one experiences peer sexual harassment,
either through passive observation, active participation, or as the unfortunate
target.67 Eventually, these students become tomorrow's employees, entering
workplaces where employers have begun to actively address the issue due to
potential liabilities."6
Logically, the decision in Davis, holding schools to a standard of liability
similar to employers who fail to address sexual harassment, will help to lessen
harassment in higher education, the workforce, and more importantly, in society
as a whole.'69  Socializing young children to view sexual harassment as
unacceptable conduct, rather than participating in it or passively observing it, will
cause victims to be less reluctant to report incidents because the negative stigma
it carries will slowly, and rightfully, shift to the instigator and not the victim.
Addressing sexual harassment in schools when individuals are in the early stages
of behavioral development helps create environments that promote respect for the
sexuality of others and a more equal society.
C. Legislative Impact
The Supreme Court's adoption of the deliberately indifferent standard sets an
extremely high benchmark for victims to meet and offers less protection than the
negligence standard applicable in cases addressing co-worker harassment under
165. Interview with Bernard James, Professor of Law at Pepperdine University School of Law and
Education Law and Policy Consultant, in Malibu, Cal. (Dec. 2, 1999) (commenting on the changing focus
in preparing future teachers which incorporates much more than traditional academic curriculum, including
how to recognize and address signs of depression, abuse, violence, and harassment).
166. See Braceras, supra note 60, at A26 (noting that prior to the decision in Davis, a victim had an
array of other state administrative, civil, and criminal remedies, however, by determining inappropriate
sexual behavior constitutes a federal cause of action for sex discrimination, the Court elevated such behavior
above other forms of student misconduct).
167. See generally Am. Ass'n of Univ. Women Found., supra note 1.
168. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1994). See also supra Part II-A, note 39, and accompanying
text (discussing the provisions of Title VII that outlaw harassment in the employment sector).
169. See Arval A. Morris, School Board Responsibility For Student On Student Sexual Harassment:
Comment On Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 137 WEST'S EDUC. L. RPR. 441, 446
(October 1999) (commenting on the far reaching implications the decision in Davis will have in grade
schools, and even more in the context of higher education where such behavior is most prevalent, reportedly
accounting for 90% of all harassment claims on college and university campuses).
Title VII. 7 ° In determining that schools should be held liable for peer sexual
harassment under Title IX, the Court relied upon its interpretation of the actual
language of the Statute.'7' This interpretation substantially impacts the qualified
immunity that schools historically have been afforded, because federal civil rights
preempt state sovereign immunity, which protected schools in the past.'
Many, including the dissent in Davis, fear the Court's policy determination
will cause courts to be the final arbiters of school policy in virtually any
disagreement arising between students.'73 Yet, regulations on peer sexual
harassment adopted by the Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights,
while the parties were arguing Davis in the courts, reflect agreement with the
Davis decision, and it is inevitable that Congress will continue to advance its
policy concerns the Court's decision in Davis supports.' 74 As time passes, if
educators are unable to produce a functional definition for peer sexual harassment
and schools and courts are left to rely on ad hoc jury decisions to define peer
sexual harassment, the burden placed upon schools may unreasonably outweigh
the positive protections allowed for in the Davis decision. Thus, it will be
necessary for Congress to provide a clear definition of what actions constitute peer
sexual harassment in order to reasonably restrain school liability in the court
system and to assist educators in identifying and attempting to prevent peer sexual
harassment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Calling upon courts to police the behavior of students may appear drastic.
Yet, the decision in Davis will effectively punish a school, not the harasser, for
failing to take actions that promote proper behavior and work to rid schools of
sexual harassment. Peer harassment is a reality to which numerous students at all
levels of education are subjected, and when not confronted effectively, denies the
victim equal access to education. Prior to the decision in Davis, many schools
170. See, e.g., Southard v. Tex. Bd. of Crim. Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 551 (5th Cir. 1997) (describing
deliberate indifference as decisions or omissions that rise to the level of "intentional choice"); Doe v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 153 F.3d 211,219 (5th Cir. 1998) (excluding decisions that are "merely inept, erroneous,
ineffective, or negligent").
171. See supra Part 1I-A and B (comparing the two standards and discussing how peer harassment
claims under Title IX, evolved from cases dealing with co-worker harassment under Title VII).
172. See Verna L. Williams & Deborah L. Brake, When a Kiss Isn't Just a Kiss: Title IX and Student-
to-Student Harassment, 30 CREIGHTONL. REv. 423,424-25 (1997) (discussing the disarray of liability in
the courts prior to Davis, and how schools found it difficult to determine their liability for harassment
because of the contradictions between emerging laws, court rulings, and the immunity schools historically
were afforded in this area of the law).
173. See Lynne Bernabei, Judicial Legislation Run Amok Court Adopts Strict Test For Harassment
Liability, LEGAL TSMEs, July 12, 1999, at S31 (criticizing the Court for engaging "in the very judicial
activism it has long criticized in lower courts that vigorously enforce the civil rights laws").
174. See Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Studentsby School Employees, Other Students,
or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12304 (Mar. 1997).
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responsibly initiated sexual harassment policies, not waiting for the Court to
mandate programs through a threat of liability.
For those schools that failed to implement harassment policies, the decision
in Davis should not be taken lightly, as the time has come for educational
institutions in our society to be pressured, if necessary, into making every effort
to create atmospheres that strive to place women and men upon equal footing.
Although it is unfortunate that some schools waited until they were faced with
monetary liability before recognizing prevention of sexual harassment as their
duty, they will no longer be allowed to lay dormant and ignore this matter.
Davis provides clear and unambiguous notice to schools that their duty, to
strive to create an atmosphere conducive to learning, includes responding to
complaints of sexual harassment and implementing preventative policies that offer
solutions before damages accrue. In the immediate future, the extent of school
liability will be tested in the courts. Hopefully, the concerns of the dissent will not
outweigh the benefits Davis will produce and only schools that act deliberately
indifferent will be made to suffer the consequences of liability for the serious harm
they choose to inflict upon the victim.
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